A division bench of Justices KM Joseph and Hrishikesh Roy of Supreme Court has rendered an important ratio that children are estopped from claiming share in the self-acquired property of their grandfather, if their father has already relinquished his rights in the said property for valuable consideration.

A bench was of the view that the effect of the estoppel cannot be warded off by persons claiming through the person whose conduct has generated the estoppel.

While hearing an appeal against a decision of the Madras High Court which had refused to grant share to the appellant-children in the self-acquired property of their grandfather, the Apex Court rendered its judgment.

Earlier the High Court had overturned the trial court order in this regard after taking note of the release deed executed by their father relinquishing his rights in the said property. The cause of action as per the plaintiff arose when a partition suit of a property was filed by two children of one Sengalani Chettiar, from his second marriage. The property in dispute was the self-acquired property of their randfather. From his first marriage, their grandfather had one son, Chandran, while from his second marriage, he had five daughters and one son.

Father of the plaintiff, was the only son of grandfather from his first marriage and he had executed a release deed with respect to the property in the year 1975 before passing away in 1978.

Chettiar (Grandfather) died in the year 1988 while his second wife died in the year 2005. Thereafter, a partition suit came to be filed by two children (plaintiffs) of Chettiar from his second marriage.

The successor of Chandran, who are the present appellants, were made the defendants to the suit.

The trial court found that the release deed in question will not bar the appellants to inherit the property of their grandfather since it was a void document for the reason that the father of the appellants had executed the same in 1975 while his father Chettiar was alive. The plaintiffs in the partition suit were, therefore, only granted 2/7 share of the property.

Aggrieved, the children of Chettiar from his second marriage approached the High Court which granted relief and the appellants were excluded from claiming any share in the said property on the ground of release deed executed by their father, Chandran.

The Supreme court noted that the suit property was a separate property of Chettiar. While analysing the affect of the release deed executed by Chandran, the Court looked into Sections 6 and 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 and observed that a person who may become the heir and entitled to succeed under the law upon the death of his relative would not have any right until succession to the estate is opened up.

The Supreme Court noted that "while Chettiar was alive, Chandran, who was his son from the first marriage would be at best be a spes successonis i.e., there was mere possibility of Chandran succeeding in a property after his father's death."

It was also noted by the Court that "unlike a co-parcener who acquires right to joint family property by his mere birth, in regard to the separate property of the Hindu, there exists no such right and, therefore, the release deed may not by itself have the effect of a transfer of the rights."

The Court then proceeded to analyse the intention of Chettiar and the effect of the release deed executed by Chandran for which he received consideration. The Court observed that words in the release deed that 'hereafter he did not have any other connection except blood relation' appeared signify that the intention of Chettiar was to deny any claim to his son, Chandran, with respect to the property.

It was noted by the Court that even if Chandran had survived his father, the conduct of executing the release deed accompanied by the receipt of consideration would have estopped Chandran from acquiring any rights in the said property.

The appellants relied on Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 1956 which provides that the natural guardian of a Hindu minor in no case bind the minor by a personal covenant. It was argued that when the release deed in the nature of a personal covenant was executed by their father, Chandran, the appellants were minors and, therefore, not bound by the deed.

The Court, observed, "The right, which they (referring to appellants) claim, at the earliest point, can arise only by treating the property as the separate property of Shri Sengalani Chettair on his death within the meaning of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act. Therefore, we are unable to discard the deed of release executed by their father Shri Chandran in the year 1975 as a covenant within the meaning of Section 8 of the ‘1956 Act.’"

The court said "they are estopped from setting up any right due to the release deed. But for the estoppel, they would have had right in the property."

It was also stated by the Court that the appellants would also not be able to claim immunity from the operation of the principle of estoppel on the basis of Section 8(a) of the Hindu Succession Act 1956 since their father, by his conduct of relinquishment, stood estopped from inheriting the property.

The Court highlighted that "We would think, therefore, that appellants would also not be in a position to claim immunity from the operation of the Principle of Estoppel on the basis of Section 8(a) of the Hindu Succession Act. ...the effect of the estoppel cannot be warded off by persons claiming through the person whose conduct has generated the estoppel," the Court underlined.

The Court added that "Estoppel would shut out in equity any claim otherwise either by Chandran or his children."

Therefore, the Court upheld the ruling of the High Court and dismissed the appeal.

Appearance of the Advocates:-

For Appellant(s) 
Mr. Siddharth Iyer, Adv.
Mr. Rakesh R. Sharma, Adv.
Mr. P. V. Yogeswaran, AOR

For Respondent(s) 
Mr. Jayanth Muth Raj, Sr. Adv.
Mrs. Malavika Jayanth, AOR
Miss. Miranda Solaman, Adv.
Mr. S. Gowthaman, AOR