The Supreme Court has held that rejection of an application under Section 156(3) CrPC does not, by itself, prevent the police from subsequently registering an FIR on the same or substantially similar allegations, as such rejection does not amount to a final adjudication on the merits.

A Bench comprising Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice N.V. Anjaria dismissed the appeal filed by Pramod Kumar Shukla, challenging the Allahabad High Court's refusal to quash an FIR registered against him in connection with allegations of cheating and fraud relating to promises of securing government employment.

₹20 Lakh Allegedly Taken for Government Jobs

According to the complainant, the appellant represented that he had influence in the Directorate of Education, Prayagraj, and could secure appointments to the post of Clerk for the complainant's son and grandson in return for ₹20 lakh.

The complainant alleged that several payments were subsequently transferred to the appellant's bank account, including ₹50,000 on January 12, 2023, ₹25,000 on January 13, ₹50,000 on January 16 and ₹50,000 on January 17.

The promised interviews allegedly never took place. The complainant further alleged that when he later demanded return of the money, the appellant abused and threatened him and his family members.

On the basis of the complaint, FIR No. 405/2024 was registered for offences under Sections 406, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 504 and 506 IPC.

Earlier Section 156(3) Application Had Been Rejected

Before registration of the FIR, the complainant had approached the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Prayagraj under Section 156(3) CrPC, seeking a direction for registration of an FIR.

The Magistrate called for a police report. The police report indicated that the dispute concerned a transaction relating to the purchase and sale of land, whereas the complainant's application alleged that money had been paid for securing government employment.

Finding the versions inconsistent, the Magistrate rejected the Section 156(3) application on September 11, 2024. The revision against that order was also dismissed.

Despite this, the police subsequently registered FIR No. 405/2024.

The appellant argued that the subsequent FIR amounted to an impermissible second round of proceedings based on substantially identical allegations and therefore ought to be quashed.

Supreme Court Examines Legal Effect of Section 156(3) Rejection

The Supreme Court framed the central question as whether rejection of a Section 156(3) application, based on substantially the same allegations, operates as a bar against subsequent criminal proceedings.

The Court explained that Section 154 CrPC provides the ordinary mechanism for setting criminal law in motion, while Section 156(3) enables a Magistrate to direct investigation where the police have failed or refused to perform their statutory duty.

The Court emphasised that an order under Section 156(3) is essentially concerned with setting the investigative machinery in motion and does not amount to adjudication of the allegations on merits.

Rejection Under Section 156(3) Is Not Final Adjudication

The Supreme Court held that an order rejecting a Section 156(3) application does not determine the rights or liabilities of the proposed accused and therefore cannot be treated as a final adjudication attracting the doctrine of res judicata.

The Court categorically held that rejection of a Section 156(3) application, being an order at the threshold without adjudication on merits after trial, cannot bar subsequent registration of an FIR or continuation of criminal proceedings based on the same or substantially similar allegations.

The Court also relied upon its earlier decision in Mahendri v. State of U.P., where it had held that rejection of a Section 156(3) application does not determine the merits of the controversy or establish the truth or falsity of allegations subsequently made in an FIR.

Police Duty to Register Cognizable Offence Remains Independent

The Supreme Court further clarified that the police's statutory obligation under Sections 154 and 156 CrPC is independent of any order passed by a Magistrate under Section 156(3).

Relying on the Constitution Bench judgment in Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh, the Court reiterated that where information discloses a cognizable offence, registration of an FIR is mandatory. The police cannot refuse registration merely because an earlier Section 156(3) application had been rejected.

Res Judicata in Criminal Proceedings: Supreme Court Clarifies Position

The Bench also discussed the applicability of the doctrine of res judicata in criminal proceedings.

Referring to its recent decision in S.C. Garg v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Court explained the apparent divergence between earlier judgments recognising res judicata in criminal proceedings and later decisions stating that the doctrine does not apply.

The Court clarified that the decisive factor is the nature and legal effect of the earlier proceeding. Where an earlier proceeding has culminated in a final adjudication on merits, the doctrine may apply. However, where the earlier proceeding has not resulted in a final adjudication on merits, such as certain proceedings for quashing an FIR, the doctrine does not operate in the same manner.

The Court specifically held that a Section 156(3) order does not constitute such a final adjudication.

FIR Cannot Be Quashed Merely on the Basis of Earlier Rejection

The appellant also argued that the monetary transactions were actually related to property dealings and that the FIR was a malicious attempt to give a civil dispute a criminal colour.

The Supreme Court, however, declined to examine the competing versions at the stage of quashing.

It held that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, the Court must examine whether the allegations in the FIR, taken at face value, disclose a cognizable offence. At that stage, the Court cannot conduct a detailed assessment of the correctness, reliability or evidentiary value of the material relied upon by either side.

The FIR alleged that the appellant had induced the complainant to pay substantial sums by promising government employment, received the money in his bank account, furnished forged admit cards and examination results, and subsequently threatened the complainant when repayment was demanded.

The Court also noted that the record indicated that the appellant was named in five FIRs involving substantially similar allegations. Taking the allegations at face value, the Court held that cognizable offences were prima facie disclosed and therefore investigation was warranted.

Supreme Court Dismisses Appeal

Finding no perversity in the Allahabad High Court's decision, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.

The Court thus allowed the investigation arising from FIR No. 405/2024 to continue and declined to quash the proceedings merely because an earlier application under Section 156(3) CrPC had been rejected.

Key Legal Principle

Rejection of an application under Section 156(3) CrPC does not amount to a final adjudication on the merits and does not, by itself, bar subsequent registration of an FIR based on the same or substantially similar allegations.

Where subsequent information discloses a cognizable offence, the police's statutory duty to register and investigate the case under Sections 154 and 156 CrPC continues to operate.

Case Details

Case: Pramod Kumar Shukla v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others

Citation: 2026 INSC 887

Representation:-

For Petitioner(s) :- Mr. Bibek Tripathi Adv., Mr. Akshat Srivastava AOR, Mr. Y. Lokesh Adv., Mr. Arun Singh Adv., Mr. Sudhakar Tiwari Adv.

For Respondent(s) :- Mr. Adarsh Upadhyay AOR, Mr. Shashank Pachauri Adv., Ms. Pallavi Kumari Adv., Ms. Parul Shukla AOR, Ms. Shubhangi Pandey Adv., Mr. Gladson Rodrigues Adv.