The Supreme Court has ruled that in university recruitments governed by the Cochin University of Science and Technology Act, 1986, the principle of communal rotation continues to apply even during the currency of a rank list. A candidate placed on a waitlist does not gain an automatic or vested right to appointment merely because the selected candidate later resigns.

A Bench comprising Justices Aravind Kumar and N.V. Anjaria dismissed the appeals filed by Radhika T., a Scheduled Caste candidate, who challenged CUSAT’s refusal to appoint her as Associate Professor in the Department of Applied Chemistry following the resignation of the originally selected candidate.

Affirming the judgments of the Kerala High Court, the Supreme Court upheld the University’s position that a vacancy arising after resignation must be filled strictly in accordance with the communal rotation prescribed under the CUSAT Act, and not necessarily by drawing the next candidate from the existing rank list based only on merit.

The controversy stemmed from a recruitment notification dated October 22, 2019, issued by CUSAT for one post of Associate Professor in Inorganic Chemistry reserved for the Scheduled Caste category. Radhika T. was ranked second, while Dr. Anitha C. Kumar, who topped the list, was appointed. After serving for more than a year, Dr. Anitha resigned on March 30, 2022, upon securing a professorship in another university.

Radhika contended that since the rank list remained valid for two years under Section 31(10) of the Act and she was next in the order of merit, she was entitled to be appointed. The University initially rejected her claim by citing lien in favour of the resigned appointee—a ground later disapproved by the High Court. Upon reconsideration, however, the University again declined appointment, stating that under Section 31(11), the vacancy had to be filled according to communal rotation, with the next turn earmarked for the Latin Catholic or Anglo Indian category.

The Supreme Court clarified that the concept of lien had no relevance once the selected candidate resigned and took up substantive employment elsewhere. Relying on State of Rajasthan v. S.N. Tiwari (2009) 4 SCC 700, the Court observed that lien stands automatically terminated upon appointment to another substantive post, without the need for any formal order. Accordingly, the earlier reasoning that Dr. Anitha retained a lien on the post was legally untenable.

On the core issue, however, the Court agreed with the University’s interpretation of communal rotation. Reading Sections 31(10) and 31(11) together, the Bench held that both provisions must be applied harmoniously. While Section 31(10) fixes the two-year life of a rank list and allows vacancies arising during that period to be filled from it, Section 31(11) simultaneously mandates that appointments follow communal rotation, treating departments as a single unit.

Rejecting the argument that communal rotation should remain suspended until the rank list expires, the Court cautioned that such an interpretation would render the rotation provision ineffective for the entire two-year period. Courts, it reiterated, must avoid constructions that reduce statutory provisions to “dead letters,” invoking the doctrine of harmonious construction to give full effect to legislative intent.

The Bench further noted that the post had already been substantively filled by a Scheduled Caste candidate, thereby fulfilling the reservation requirement in both form and substance. Once that appointee resigned, the vacancy that emerged was a fresh vacancy, which had to be filled in accordance with the next turn in the communal rotation roster, notwithstanding the continued validity of the rank list.

The Court explained that the provision declaring the rank list to be valid for two years merely defines its lifespan, whereas the requirement of communal rotation governs the method and manner of filling vacancies during that period. Interpreting Section 31(11) as inoperative during the currency of the rank list would defeat the very purpose of the rotation rule and was therefore impermissible.

Distinguishing earlier decisions cited by the appellant, including Narayanan v. State of Kerala, the Court observed that those cases dealt with situations where the selected candidate never joined the post. In contrast, the present case involved an appointee who had joined service, completed probation, and resigned only thereafter, thereby activating the communal rotation mechanism.

Reiterating settled law, the Supreme Court emphasized that a wait list is not a source of recruitment and does not confer an enforceable right to appointment. Its operation, even during its validity, remains subject to statutory provisions governing reservation and rotation.

Finding no illegality in the University’s action, the Court dismissed the appeals and affirmed the Kerala High Court’s rulings, holding that since the appellant did not belong to the Latin Catholic or Anglo Indian category, she could not claim appointment to the vacancy that arose.

Appearances: Senior Advocate Mohan Gopal for the appellant; Advocate Pranjal Kishore for the respondent.
Case: Radhika T. v. Cochin University of Science and Technology